Citizens’ Freedom to Choose Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and “Fragmented” Parliaments
Paulo Pereira () and
João Andrade e Silva
No 2007/13, Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract:
The analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district size and electoral formulae. Using data from twenty nine countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.
Keywords: Ballot structure; Electoral index; Freedom to choose; Personal vote. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp132007
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More papers in Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa Department of Economics, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL.
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