On the Release of Players to National Teams

Oliver Guertler (), Markus Lang and Tim Pawlowski
Additional contact information
Oliver Guertler: Department of Economics, University of Cologne
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oliver Gürtler

No 151, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU)

Abstract: The release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players' stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention in this conflict by a governing body is desirable. We show that bargaining between the club and the national team yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensation is either prohibited or limited. If, however, the national team is allowed to pay unlimited financial compensation to the club, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.

Keywords: National team; release of players; compensation payment; bargaining; team sports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/151_ISU_full.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2015)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:wpaper:0151

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IBW IT ().