Heterogeneity of Southern Countries and Southern Intellectual Property Rights Policy

Harvey Lapan and Jeong Eon Kim

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.

Date: 2006-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Canadian Journal of Economics, August 2008, vol. 41, pp. 894-925

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_12549_06008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy (2008)
Journal Article: Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy (2008)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy (2008)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity of Southern Countries and Southern Intellectual Property Rights Policy (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12549

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().