Optimal Auction with Resale

Charles Zheng

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two-bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller. (This paper was not from my dissertation.)

Date: 2002-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (86)

Published in Econometrica, November 2002, vol. 70 no. 6, pp. 2197-2224

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Auction with Resale (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12664

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().