Setting Incentives for Collaboration Among Agricultural Scientists: Application of Principal-Agent Theory to Team Work

Wallace E. Huffman

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems that are likely to arise in this new funding structure.

Keywords: incentives; Principal-agent model; team research; competitive grants; multi-disciplinary research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cta, nep-ino and nep-ppm
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p11633-2010-06-22.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Setting incentives for collaboration among agricultural scientists: application of principal-agent theory to team work (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:31633

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().