EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Entry under placement uncertainty

Sunanda Roy, Rajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger ()

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a model of firm entry in an industry that operates under an aggregate production quota or cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation. Firms are heterogeneous in their own productivity; each knows its costs of production but is uncertain about where its costs rank among an entrant population. We show the existence of a unique, symmetric, dominance solvable, Bayesian Nash equilibrium in switching strategies in a parameterized game with a continuum of players. Our main result is that uncertainty over one’s productivity rank is sufficient to cause socially inefficient over-entry when the average cost in the population of potential entrants is low. We find socially inefficient under-entry when the opposite conditions hold. Within both the class of models on global games with strategic substitutes and the class of models on firm entry, our model offers innovative insights into inefficient over-entry, under-entry, and introduces a novel underlying mechanism that drives entry bias.

Date: 2023-08-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ent, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/bitstreams/84ef7bf0-0f2 ... dbd2013eec9/download
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:202102240800001096

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202102240800001096