UNDERSTANDING PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INSTATE GOVERNMENTS: A Diffusion Theory Approach

Sangyub Ryu (), John Ronquillo () and Cora Terry ()
Additional contact information
Sangyub Ryu: International University of University, http://www.iuj.ac.jp/
John Ronquillo: DePaul University, http://www.depaul.edu/Pages/default.aspx
Cora Terry: The University of Georgia, http://www.uga.edu/

No EMS_2013_17, Working Papers from Research Institute, International University of Japan

Abstract: Since the New Public Management is emphasized, the practices of the business sector have been introduced to the public sector without careful assessment. One of the examples is the adoption of pay-for-performance across state governments. Although theories of pay-for-performance may be compelling, scholars have found failures of payfor-performance in the public sector. This study applies a diffusion theory to understand why state governments have adopted pay-for-performance although its effectiveness was not confirmed. Findings show that state governments tend to adopt pay-for-performance as their neighboring states have previously adopted it, but the marginal probability of adoption decreases as more neighbors have adopted pay-for-performance.

Keywords: pay-for-performance; policy diffusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-hrm and nep-nps
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iuj.ac.jp/workingpapers/index.cfm?File=EMS_2013_17.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2013_17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Research Institute, International University of Japan 777 Kokusai-cho, Minami Uonuma0-shi, Niigata 949-7277 JAPAN. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kazumi Imai, Office of Academic Affairs ().