Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions

Eric Rasmusen (erasmuse@indiana.edu)

No 2004-13, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Suppose a bidder must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating his own private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder would like to know the private values of other bidders. It also can explain sniping — flurries of bids at the end of auctions with deadlines — as the result of other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder to examine his value.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2006

Downloads: (external link)
http://kelley.iu.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2004-13-rasmusen.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions (2006)
Working Paper: Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rick Harbaugh (riharbau@indiana.edu).