Negligence and Two-Sided Causation

Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin () and Hyo-Youn Chu
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Keith N. Hylton: Boston University Law School
Hyo-Youn Chu: Kyung Hee University

No 2013-05, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We extend the economic analysis of negligence and intervening causation to "two-sided causation" scenarios. In the two-sided causation scenario the effectiveness of the injurer's care depends on some intervention, and the risk of harm generated by the injurer's failure to take care depends on some other intervention. We find that the distortion from socially optimal care is more severe in the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided causation scenario, and generally in the direction of excessive care. The practical lesson is that the likelihood that injurers will have optimal care incentives under the negligence test in the presence of intervening causal factors is low.

Keywords: negligence; causation; proximate cause; intervening causal factor; optimal care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 K00 K13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-law and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2013-05

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