Negligence, Causation and Incentive for Care

Keith N. Hylton and Haizhen Lin ()
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Keith N. Hylton: Boston University Law School

No 2013-07, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, on the level of care. In this model, the injurer’s decision to take care reduces the likelihood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs. The effects of the negligence test depend on the information available to the court, and the manner in which the test is implemented. The key effect of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, is to induce actors to take into account the distribution of the intervention probability as well as its expected value. In the most plausible scenario – where courts have limited information – the test generally leads to socially excessive care.

Keywords: nnegligence; causation; proximate cause; factual causation; ex post negligence; optimal care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 K00 K13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Negligence, causation, and incentives for care (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2013-07

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