ON THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING DECISIONS WITHIN THE EU-25

Federico Valenciano (), Annick Laruelle () and Ricardo Martínez
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Ricardo Martínez: Universidad de La Rioja
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ricardo Martinez and Ricardo Martinez ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we measure the effect of the quota on the difficulty of making decisions in the EU-25 Council after the next enlargement. We compute the probability of a proposal being rejected in the Council. This probability depends on the voting rule (and therefore on the quota) and on the probabilities of the different vote configurations. Here we do not consider that all vote configurations are equiprobable, the classical implicit or explicit assumption. We assume that vote configurations with a minority of members states in favour of the proposal have a null probability, with other vote configurations being equiprobable.

Keywords: European Council; Decision making; Voting rules; European enlargement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-15

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