STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS WITH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOODS

José Rueda-Llano () and Luis Corchon
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José Rueda-Llano: Universidad de Alicante

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality or by Envy-Freeness. Journal of Economic Literature

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; public goods economies; differentiable mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-29

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