OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES

Olivier Gossner, Abraham Neyman () and Penelope Hernandez ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Keywords: Repeated games; communication; entropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2005-06.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal use of communication resources (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-06

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