INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN AUCTIONS: SEALED BIDS VS. OPEN BIDS

Ángel Hernando Veciana ()
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Ángel Hernando Veciana: Universidad de Alicante
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Angel Hernando-Veciana ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in anauction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the otherbidders before they bid. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price)auction induces more information acquisition about a common component ofthe value than the open (English) auction, but less about the private componentof the value. Moreover, under our assumptions more information about theprivate value and less information about the common value improves efficiencyand revenue in some sense. Consequently, our results suggest new argumentsin favor of the open auction.

Keywords: auctions; open information acquisition; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2006-10.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-10

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