A MODEL FOR TEAM MANAGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF SELF-SERVING WORKERS

Brice Corgnet

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information. We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers¿ abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers¿ true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in theabsence of asymmetry of information.

JEL-codes: C70 C73 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2007-18.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().