The role of the interchange fee on the effect of forbidding price discrimination of ATM services

Ramón Faulí-Oller ()
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Ramón Faulí-Oller: Universidad de Alicante

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We consider whether banks should be allowed to set different ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the bank. In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002), without considering an interchange fee, a ban on price discrimination on ATM services increases total surplus. In the present model that considers an interchange fee, the effect of a ban on price discrimination depends on the way the interchange is fixed. If it is fixed to maximize the profits of banks, forbidding price discrimination reduces total surplus. However, if the interchange is fixed to maximize total surplus, banning price discrimination increases total surplus.

Keywords: ATM; surcharge; foreign fee; interchange fee; collusion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-03

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