Education and selective vouchers

Amedeo Piolatto

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: The literature on vouchers often concludes that a voucher-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that it is possible to propose selective vouchers (of exogenous value) such that the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. As long as the introduction of vouchers does not undermine the existence of public schools, introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement. Some agents use vouchers in equilibrium to buy private education, while the poorest agents continue attending public schools and enjoy an increase in per-capita expenditure.

Keywords: positive public economics; education; vouchers; voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H42 I20 I22 I28 I29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-hrm, nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2009-10.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Education and selective vouchers (2010)
Working Paper: Education and selective vouchers (2010)
Working Paper: Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-10

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