Relative Injustice Aversion

Luis José Blas Moreno Garrido ()
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Luis José Blas Moreno Garrido: Dpto. Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: I propose a new utility function based on the relative aversion to injustice to explain why, in bargaining games, neither classical equilibria nor inequality aversion equilibria hold when money is not windfall, but it is the result of the effort. This utility function generalizes the concept of inequality aversion when agents have beliefs about what they deserve, and it is able to explain rejections in non zero-sum games. I analyze the agents' behavior and their bargaining power in the dictator game, ultimatum game and (0,1)-ultimatum game and results are compared within those games.

Keywords: Injustice Aversion; Distribution; Property Rights; Bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 D63 D64 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2015-08

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