Independence of central banks after the crisis - focus on Hungary

Lisa Coiffard (lisa.coiffard@sciencespo.fr)
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Lisa Coiffard: Paris Institute of Political Studies, Sciences Po Paris

No 242, IWE Working Papers from Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: The changes of the Hungarian financial regulation reflect the power of the Fidesz-government to challenge the European institutions. With the new structure of the Hungarian Central Bank (MNB) and unorthodox macroeconomic policy, Hungary uses the global trends in the financial sector to deviate from the European treaties. The complex European structure is not able to face the new challenges with its tools and is more than ever obliged to counter such behaviors to preserve the credibility and the values of the European project.

Keywords: financial regulation; MNB; ECB; central banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 G2 H3 K4 N24 P2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his, nep-mac and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iwe:workpr:242

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