Returns to Office in National and Local Politics
Kaisa Kotakorpi (),
Panu Poutvaara and
Marko Terviö ()
Additional contact information
Kaisa Kotakorpi: University of Turku
Marko Terviö: Aalto University
No 10003, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
We estimate the effect of getting elected on future income development of political candidates. We present a bootstrap approach for measuring electoral closeness, which can be used to implement a regression discontinuity design in any electoral system. We apply the method to the Finnish proportional open list system. Being elected to parliament increases annual earnings initially by €20,000, and getting elected to a municipal council by €1,000. The returns to office for parliamentarians accrue mainly through higher wages during the time in office. Our results imply that the returns to office may be large even in the absence of corruption.
Keywords: returns to office; elections; regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-pol
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Citations:
Published - published in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2017, 33 (3), 413–442
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https://docs.iza.org/dp10003.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Returns to Office in National and Local Politics (2014) 
Working Paper: Returns to Office in National and Local Politics (2013) 
Working Paper: Returns to office in national and local politics (2013) 
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