Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force

Guido Friebel (), Michael Kosfeld and Gerd Thielmann
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Gerd Thielmann: Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei

No 10410, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We conduct experimental games with police applicants in Germany to investigate whether intrinsically motivated agents self-select into this type of public service. Our focus is on trustworthiness and the willingness to enforce norms of cooperation as key dimensions of intrinsic motivation in the police context. We find that police applicants are more trustworthy than non-applicants, i.e., they return higher shares as second-movers in a trust game. Furthermore, they invest more in rewards and punishment when they can enforce cooperation as a third party. Our results provide clear evidence for self-selection of motivated agents into the German police force, documenting an important mechanism that influences the match between jobs and agents in public service.

Keywords: self-selection; intrinsic motivation; public service; norm enforcement; trustworthiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D64 D73 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-soc
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Published - published in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, 11 (4), 59-78

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force (2019)
Working Paper: Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force (2016)
Working Paper: Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force (2016)
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