Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools

Naureen Karachiwalla and Albert Park

No 10547, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, high wage increases for promotion are associated with better performance, teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility, and reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.

Keywords: teacher incentives; promotions; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J33 J45 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-hrm, nep-lma, nep-tra and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2017, 146, 109-128

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Related works:
Journal Article: Promotion incentives in the public sector: Evidence from Chinese schools (2017)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2017)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2016)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2015)
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