Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil

Fernanda Brollo (fernanda.brollo@merlin.fae.ua.es), Katja Kaufmann and Eliana La Ferrara (eliana.laferrara@unibocconi.it)
Additional contact information
Fernanda Brollo: University of Warwick
Eliana La Ferrara: Bocconi University

No 10654, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on children's school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a child's attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings' classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households' response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement.

Keywords: enforcement; conditional welfare programs; learning; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I25 I38 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-dev and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil (2017)
Working Paper: Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil (2017)
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