Sir! I'd Rather Go to School, Sir!

Mahdi Majbouri ()

No 10787, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Military service is a popular method of army recruitment for governments of developing countries that are particularly prone to conflict. This study contributes to the largely under-researched issues of military service by looking at an unintended consequence of a military service exemption policy and answering a principal question: is there a fear of conscription among the youth? It uses a discontinuity in the military service law in an under-researched country, Iran, and offers causal evidence that fear of conscription entices young men to get more education against their will. This exogenous increase is used to estimate returns to education.

Keywords: regression discontinuity; natural experiment; coercive labor market; conscription; higher-educational attainment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 I26 J47 N35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa and nep-lma
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Working Paper: Sir! I’d Rather Go to School, Sir! (2018)
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