Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment

Alexander Koch and Julia Nafziger

No 10955, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study in an online, real-effort experiment how the bracketing of non-binding goals affects performance in a work-leisure self-control problem. We externally induce the goal bracket – daily goals or a weekly goal – and within that bracket let subjects set goals for how much they want to work over a one-week period. Our theoretical model predicts (i) that weekly goals create incentives to compensate for a lower than desired performance today with the promise to work harder tomorrow, whereas daily goals exclude such excuses; (ii) that subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and work harder than those with weekly goals. Our data support these predictions. Surprisingly, however, when goals are combined with an externally enforced commitment that requires subjects to spend less than a minute each day on the task to get started working, performance deteriorates because of high dropout rates from the task.

Keywords: real effort; commitment devices; narrow bracketing; goals; self-control; online experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 70 pages
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Theory , 2020, 185, 104949

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Related works:
Journal Article: Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment (2017)
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