Dual Practice by Health Workers: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia

Paula González, Gabriel Montes-Rojas () and Sarmistha Pal

No 11038, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using a simple theoretical model we conjecture that dual practice may increase the number of patients seen but reduce hours spent at public facilities, if public physicians lack motivation and/or if their opportunity costs are very large. Using data from Indonesia, we then test these theoretical conjectures. Our identification strategy relies on a 1997 legislation necessitating health professionals to apply for license for private practice only after three years of graduation. Results using a difference-in-difference regression discontinuity design provides support to our conjectures, identifying the role of weak work discipline, lack of motivation and opportunity costs of public service provision.

Keywords: motivation; weak monitoring; Ministry of Health Regulation; dual practice of health professionals; opportunity costs of public service; Indonesia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 J2 J44 J45 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea, nep-lma and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Dual Practice by Health Workers: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia (2017)
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