Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils

Uwe Jirjahn and Stephen Smith

No 11066, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Theories of how nonunion employee representation impacts firm performance, affects market equilibria, and generates externalities on labor and society are synthesized. Mandated works councils in Germany provide a particularly strong form of nonunion employee representation. A systematic review of research on the German experience with mandated works councils finds generally positive effects, though these effects depend on a series of moderating factors and some impacts remain ambiguous. Finally, key questions for empirical research on nonunion employee representation, which have previously been little analyzed in the literature, are reviewed.

Keywords: organizational failures; works councils; nonunion representation; market failures; society (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2018, 89 (1), 201-234

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Related works:
Journal Article: NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: THEORY AND THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH MANDATED WORKS COUNCILS (2018)
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017)
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017)
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017)
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