Does the Framing of Patient Cost-Sharing Incentives Matter? The Effects of Deductibles vs. No-Claim Refunds

Arthur P. Hayen, Tobias Klein and Martin Salm
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Arthur P. Hayen: Tilburg University

No 11508, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In light of increasing health care expenditures, patient cost-sharing schemes have emerged as one of the main policy tools to reduce medical spending. We show that the effect of patient cost-sharing schemes on health care expenditures is not only determined by the economic incentives they provide, but also by the way these economic incentives are framed. Patients react to changes in economic incentives almost twice as strongly under a deductible policy than under a no-claims refund policy. Our preferred explanation is that individuals are loss-averse and respond differently to both schemes because they perceive deductible payments as a loss and no-claim refunds as a gain.

Keywords: framing; health insurance; patient cost-sharing; loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H51 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published - published in: Journal of Health Economics, 2021, 80, 102520

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? the effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds (2021)
Working Paper: Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds (2019)
Working Paper: Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds (2018)
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