Special Interest Groups versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Patrick Balles (), Ulrich Matter () and Alois Stutzer
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Patrick Balles: University of Basel
Ulrich Matter: University of Basel

No 11945, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Asymmetric information between voters and legislative representatives poses a major challenge to the functioning of representative democracy. We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Combining data on campaign finance donations made by individuals and special interest groups with information on their preferences for particular bills, we construct novel measures of electoral and organized interests pressure that representatives face with regard to specific legislative votes. In our analysis based on 490 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we find strong evidence that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics. Thereby, we draw on exogenous newsworthy shock events that crowd out news on the legislative process, but are themselves not related to it. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.

Keywords: roll call voting; media attention; mass media; legislative voting; interest groups; campaign finance; attention; US House of Representatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - published in: Economic Journal, 2024, 134 (662), 2290 - 2320

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Related works:
Journal Article: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2024)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2024)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2020)
Working Paper: Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention (2018)
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