Motivating Bureaucrats through Social Recognition: External Validity — A Tale of Two States

Varun Gauri (vgauri@worldbank.org), Julian C. Jamison (julison@gmail.com), Nina Mazar (nmazar@bu.edu) and Owen Ozier
Additional contact information
Varun Gauri: World Bank
Julian C. Jamison: University of Exeter
Nina Mazar: Boston University

No 12251, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Bureaucratic performance is a crucial determinant of economic growth, but little real-world evidence exists on how to improve it, especially in resource-constrained settings. We conducted a field experiment of a social recognition intervention to improve record keeping in health facilities in two Nigerian states, replicating the intervention - implemented by a single organization - on bureaucrats performing identical tasks. Social recognition improved performance in one state but had no effect in the other, highlighting both the potential benefits and also the sometimes-limited generalizability of behavioral interventions. Furthermore, differences in facility-level observables did not explain cross-state differences in impacts, suggesting that it may often be difficult to predict external validity.

Keywords: behavioral insights; bureaucracy; external validity; RCT; nudges; healthcare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D73 D91 I18 L38 O35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2021, 163, 117-131

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Journal Article: Motivating bureaucrats through social recognition: External validity—A tale of two states (2021)
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