Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform

Macarena Kutscher (), Shanjukta Nath and Sergio Urzua
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Macarena Kutscher: University of Maryland

No 13305, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates whether centralized admissions systems can alter school segregation. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decentralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its incremental implementation and employ a Difference-in-Difference design. Using rich administrative student-level records, we find the effect of SAS critically depends on pre-existing levels of residential segregation and local school supply. For instance, districts with prominent provision of private education experience an uptick in school segregation due to SAS. Migration of high-SES students to private schools emerges as a key driver.

Keywords: segregation; inequality; education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I24 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-ore and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2023, 221, 104863

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Journal Article: Centralized admission systems and school segregation: Evidence from a national reform (2023)
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