Incentives for Cooperation in Teams: Sociality Meets Decision Rights

Britta Butz (), Pablo Guillen and Christine Harbring ()
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Britta Butz: RWTH Aachen University
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University

No 14242, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20 % of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 % and 20 %. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. Voting in favor of a 20 % donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment has positive effects on contributions to the public good compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.

Keywords: laboratory experiment; team incentives; public good game; decision right; donations; charitable giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D64 D70 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published - published in: Review of Managerial Science, 2024, 18, 2925 - 2951

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