Aversion to Breaking Rules and Migration

Massimo Anelli, Tommaso Colussi () and Andrea Ichino
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Tommaso Colussi: Catholic University Milan

No 14286, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Migration movements may increase the geographic dispersion of the Aversion to Breaking Rules (ABR) in a population, with possible long-term economic consequences. We show this result with Italian Census data, using indicators of false birth date registrations for families of South-North migrants and remainers in the two macro-regions. Within locality×biennium cells, deterrence and cheating benefits are similar in the two groups and thus cheating differences are informative about the underlying ABR, as our theory suggests. We also exploit the Fascist reforms of 1926 as shocks to deterrence, offering additional information on the underlying ABR of migrant and remainer families.

Keywords: migration; aversion to breaking rules; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J61 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 88 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Aversion to breaking rules and migration (2021)
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