Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

Eliana Carranza, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin () and Neil Rankin

No 14529, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We present field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.

Keywords: labor markets; wages; employment; job search; skills; active labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J24 J31 J41 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-exp and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: American Economic Review, 2022, 112 (11), 3547 - 3583

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Related works:
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020)
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020)
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills (2020)
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