The Impact of Sleep Restriction on Interpersonal Conflict Resolution and the Narcotic Effect

David Dickinson, David McEvoy () and David Bruner

No 14536, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Insufficient sleep is commonplace, and understanding how this affects interpersonal conflict holds implications for personal and workplace settings. We experimentally manipulated participant sleep state for a full week prior to administering a stylized bargaining task that models payoff uncertainty at impasse with a final-offer arbitration (FOA) procedure. FOA use in previous trials decreases the likelihood of voluntary settlements going forward—the narcotic effect. We also report a novel result that a significantly stronger narcotic effect is estimated for more sleepy bargaining pairs. One implication is that insufficient sleep predicts increased dependency on alternatives to voluntarily resolution of interpersonal conflict.

Keywords: dispute/conflict resolution; arbitration; sleep restriction; bargaining; narcotic effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 D83 D90 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-neu
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Published - revised version published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022, 194, 71-90.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of sleep restriction on interpersonal conflict resolution and the narcotic effect (2022)
Working Paper: The impact of sleep restriction on interpersonal conflict resolution and the narcotic effect (2021)
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