Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
Andrew Johnston
No 14831, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
I conduct a discrete-choice experiment with responses linked to administrative teacher and student records to examine teacher preferences for compensation structure and working conditions. I calculate willingness-to-pay for a rich set of work attributes. High-performing teachers have similar preferences to other teachers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. Taking the preference estimates at face value I explore how schools should structure compensation to meet various objectives. Under each objective, schools appear to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement. Restructuring compensation can increase both teacher welfare and student achievement.
Keywords: compensation structure; teacher labor markets; teacher quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J32 J45 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Citations:
Forthcoming - forthcoming in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
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Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay (2024) 
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