Privatizing Disability Insurance

Arthur Seibold (), Sebastian Seitz and Sebastian Siegloch
Additional contact information
Arthur Seibold: University of Mannheim

No 15579, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Public disability insurance (DI) programs in many countries face pressure to reduce their generosity in order to remain sustainable. In this paper, we investigate the welfare effects of giving a larger role to private insurance markets in the face of public DI cuts. Exploiting a unique reform that abolished one part of the German public DI system for younger workers, we find that despite significant crowding-in effects, overall private DI take-up remains modest. We do not find any evidence of adverse selection on unpriced risk. On the contrary, private DI tends to be concentrated among high-income, high-education and low-risk individuals. Using a revealed preferences approach, we estimate individual DI valuations, a key input for welfare calculations. We find that observed willingness-to-pay of many individuals is low, such that providing DI partly via a private insurance market with choice improves welfare. However, we show that distributional concerns as well as individual risk misperceptions can provide grounds for justifying a full public DI mandate.

Keywords: disability insurance; social insurance; mandate; privatization; risk-based selection; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 G52 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pbe and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp15579.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Privatizing Disability Insurance (2022)
Working Paper: Privatizing Disability Insurance (2022)
Working Paper: Privatizing Disability Insurance (2022)
Working Paper: Privatizing disability insurance (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15579

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().