Physicians Treating Physicians: Relational and Informational Advantages in Treatment and Survival

Stacey H. Chen (), Jennjou Chen, Hongwei Chuang and Tzu-Hsin Lin
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Stacey H. Chen: University of Tokyo
Jennjou Chen: National Chengchi University
Hongwei Chuang: International University of Japan
Tzu-Hsin Lin: National Taiwan University

No 16048, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use the medical specialties of physician-patients with advanced cancer to study the role of knowledge versus networks in treatment choices and patient survival by matching comparable patients with doctors and admission periods to control unobserved doctor quality. Physician-patients are less likely to have surgery, radiation, or checkups and more likely to receive targeted therapy, spend more on drugs, enjoy a higher survival rate, and spend less on coinsurance than non-physician-patients. Knowledge mechanisms play a crucial role because the network effect explains some, but not all, patterns. For less informed physician-patients, possessing a network is equivalent to reducing medical knowledge.

Keywords: communication; social ties; physician quality; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I11 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Published - published online in: Journal of Labor Economics , 2025, 43 (1), 15- 46

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