Should You Meet the Parents? The Impact of Information on Non-test Score Attributes on School Choice

Elisa Facchetti (), Lorenzo Neri () and Marco Ovidi
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Lorenzo Neri: University of St. Andrews

No 16064, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Understanding parental response to non-test score attributes is crucial to design effective school choice systems. We study an intervention providing parents with hard-to-find information on the school environment while holding information on school performance constant. The provision of this information decreases the outflow to private institutions by 17% and increases enrollment at local state schools, particularly among high-income and high-performing students. This intervention encourages parents to expand their state-school search without affecting their taste for academic performance, generating increased competition for schools with desirable attributes. These findings imply that simple, low-cost interventions may improve state schools' finances and composition.

Keywords: school choice; non-test score school attributes; information intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 I24 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-edu and nep-ure
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should You Meet the Parents? The Impact of Information on Non-Test Score Attributes on School Choice (2024)
Working Paper: Should you Meet The Parents? The impact of information on non-test score attributes on school choice (2021)
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