The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings

Brian Callaci (), Matthew Gibson, Sergio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum and Matt Walsh
Additional contact information
Brian Callaci: Open Markets Institute
Matt Walsh: Burning Glass Technologies

No 16330, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We evaluate the impact of the Washington State Attorney General's enforcement campaign against employee no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts, which unfolded from 2018 through early 2020. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports, we document the nationwide effect of the enforcement campaign on pay at franchising chains across numerous industries. Our preferred specification estimates a 6.6% increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and an approximate 4% increase in worker-reported earnings.

Keywords: antitrust; franchising; employer market power; oligopsony (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J42 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published online in: Review of Economics and Statistics, 25 November 2024

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp16330.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16330

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().