The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior
Lina Lozano (),
Arno Riedl and
Christina Rott ()
Additional contact information
Lina Lozano: New York University, Abu Dhabi
Christina Rott: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
No 16768, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on the information players have. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates.
Keywords: bargaining; asymmetric information; menstrual cycle; biological factors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D87 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior (2024) 
Working Paper: The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior (2024) 
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