A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games

Joseph-Simon Goerlach () and Nicolas Motz
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Joseph-Simon Goerlach: Bocconi University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joseph-Simon Görlach

No 16809, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Keywords: bargaining power; non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Working Paper: A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-Cooperative Games (2024)
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