Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid

Gil Epstein and Ira Gang

No 1711, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, for example, poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support play a potentially important role for nongovernmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with nongovernmental organizations as intermediaries.

Keywords: aid; contests; NGOs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Review of Development Economics, 2006, 10 (2), 285-296

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Journal Article: Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid (2006)
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