Simultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition

Pieter Gautier and Ronald Wolthoff

No 2056, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and both to the low productivity sector. Efficiency requires however that they apply to both sectors because then the coordination frictions are lowest. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search. Allowing for free entry creates a second source of inefficiency.

Keywords: efficiency; coordination frictions; directed search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E24 J23 J24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published - published in: Labour Economics, 2009, 16 (3), 311-319

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simultaneous search with heterogeneous firms and ex post competition (2009)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition (2007)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition (2006)
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