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Regulatory Barriers and Entry in Developing Economies

John Bennett () and Saul Estrin ()
Additional contact information
Saul Estrin: London School of Economics

No 2150, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough.

Keywords: entry; developing economy; entry barriers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L50 O14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dev, nep-ent, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in Review of Development Economics, 2013, 17, 685-698

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Working Paper: Regulatory Barriers and Entry in Developing Economies (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Regulatory Barriers and Entry in Developing Economies (2006) Downloads
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