Relational Goods, Monitoring and Non-Pecuniary Compensations in the Nonprofit Sector: The Case of the Italian Social Services

Michele Mosca (), Marco Musella () and Francesco Pastore
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Marco Musella: University of Naples Federico II

No 2254, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the nonprofit wage gap suggesting a theoretical framework where, like in Akerlof (1984), effort correlates not only with wages, but also with non-monetary compensations. These take the form of relational goods and services by-produced in the delivery of particular services. By paying higher non-pecuniary compensations, the nonprofit sector attracts intrinsically similarly skilled, but more motivated workers, able to provide in fact a higher level of effort than their counterparts in the forprofit sector. On an empirical ground, the paper provides a number of econometric tests that confirm the main predictions of the model in Italy’s case. It adds to the available empirical literature by introducing in the analysis direct measures of non-pecuniary compensations and job satisfaction.

Keywords: efficiency wages; non-profit organisations; job satisfaction; wage determination; relational goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I00 J31 L31 L84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - published in: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2007, 78 (1), 57-86

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Journal Article: RELATIONAL GOODS, MONITORING AND NON‐PECUNIARY COMPENSATIONS IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN SOCIAL SERVICES (2007)
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