The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited

Steffen Habermalz

No 2309, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.

Keywords: employer learning; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 I20 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Applied Economics Letters, 2011, 18 (7), 607-610

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp2309.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2309

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().