Cooperative Household Models

Patricia Apps () and Ray Rees

No 3127, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We set out a general framework for cooperative household models, based on Samuelson's idea of a household welfare function, but extending it to incorporate the key insight from Nash bargaining models – the idea that the household’s preference ordering over the utility profiles of its members depends on their wage rates (or prices more generally) and non-wage incomes. Applying reasonable general restrictions on the effects of changes in these variables allows derivation of the general implications of cooperative models.

Keywords: generalisation; household; model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp3127.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3127

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().