Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes

Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni

No 3693, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.

Keywords: lobbying; political institutions; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E23 H26 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published - published as 'Political institutions, lobbying and corruption' in: Journal of Institutional Economics , 2017, 13 (4), 917-939

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes (2008)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes (2008)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes (2008)
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