Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining

Joaquin Andaluz, Miriam Marcén and José Alberto Molina

No 3757, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.

Keywords: family bargaining; Stackelberg game; family good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C72 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-lab
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Published - published as 'Which spouse first decides in the household? The dynamics of bargaining' in: Theoretical Economics Letters, 2013, 3, 69-77

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining (2009)
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